International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Volume 2022

SoC Root Canal!:

Root Cause Analysis of Power Side-Channel Leakage in System-on-Chip Designs


Pantea Kiaei
Worcester Polytechnic Institute

Patrick Schaumont
Worcester Polytechnic Institute


Keywords: Side-channel Analysis, Design-time Methodology, Micro-architecture, Root-cause Analysis


Abstract

Finding the root cause of power-based side-channel leakage becomes harder when multiple layers of design abstraction are involved. While side-channel leakage originates in processor hardware, the dangerous consequences may only become apparent in the cryptographic software that runs on the processor. This contribution presents RootCanal, a methodology to explain the origin of side-channel leakage in a software program in terms of the underlying micro-architecture and system architecture. We simulate the hardware power consumption at the gate level and perform a non-specific test to identify the logic gates that contribute most sidechannel leakage. Then, we back-annotate those findings to the related activities in the software. The resulting analysis can automatically point out non-trivial causes of side-channel leakages. To illustrate RootCanal’s capabilities, we discuss a collection of case studies.

Publication

Transactions of Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Volume 2022, Issue 4

Paper

Artifact

Artifact number
tches/2022/a25

Artifact published
November 6, 2022

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BibTeX How to cite

Kiaei, P., & Schaumont, P. (2022). SoC Root Canal! Root Cause Analysis of Power Side-Channel Leakage in System-on-Chip Designs. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2022(4), 751–773. https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2022.i4.751-773, Artifact available at https://artifacts.iacr.org/tches/2022/a25.