International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

EUROCRYPT 2024

Partial Sums Meet FFT: Improved Attack on 6-Round AES


Orr Dunkelman
University of Haifa

Shibam Ghosh
University Of Haifa

Nathan Keller
Bar Ilan University

Gaetan Leurent
Inria, Paris

Avichai Marmor
Bar Ilan University

Victor Mollimard
University of Haifa


Keywords:


Abstract

The /partial sums/ cryptanalytic technique was introduced in 2000 by Ferguson et al., who used it to break 6-round AES with time complexity of 2^{52} S-box computations – a record that has not been beaten ever since. In 2014, Todo and Aoki showed that for 6-round AES, partial sums can be replaced by a technique based on the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), leading to an attack with a comparable complexity.

In this paper we show that the partial sums technique can be combined with an FFT-based technique, to get the best of the two worlds. Using our combined technique, we obtain an attack on 6-round AES with complexity of about 2^{46.4} additions. We fully implemented the attack experimentally, along with the partial sums attack and the Todo-Aoki attack, and confirmed that our attack improves the best known attack on 6-round AES by a factor of more than 32.

We expect that our technique can be used to significantly enhance numerous attacks that exploit the partial sums technique. To demonstrate this, we use our technique to improve the best known attack on 7-round Kuznyechik by a factor of more than 80.

Publication

EUROCRYPT 2024

Paper

Artifact

Artifact number
eurocrypt/2024/a7

Artifact published
June 15, 2024

README

ZIP (5.6 MB)  

View on Github

License
This work is licensed under the 2-Clause BSD License.


BibTeX How to cite

Dunkelman, O., Ghosh, S., Keller, N., Leurent, G., Marmor, A., Mollimard, V. (2024). Partial Sums Meet FFT: Improved Attack on 6-Round AES. In: Joye, M., Leander, G. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2024. EUROCRYPT 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 14651. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58716-0_5. Artifact available at https://artifacts.iacr.org/eurocrypt/2024/a7